The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race
and Social Justice
Volume 20

Number 2

Article 2

5-2018

Prisoner's Dilemma—Exhausted Without a Place of Rest(itution):
Why the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement
Needs to Be Amended
Ryan Lefkowitz
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Cultural Heritage Law
Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law
and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal
History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, National Security Law Commons,
State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
20 Scholar 189 (2018).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social
Justice by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

Lefkowitz: Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement

NOTE

PRISONER’S DILEMMA—
EXHAUSTED WITHOUT A PLACE OF REST(ITUTION):
WHY THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT’S
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT NEEDS TO BE AMENDED
RYAN LEFKOWITZ∗

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

Introduction ............................................................................... 191
The Legislative History and Intent of the PLRA ...................... 193
The PLRA as Interpreted by the Supreme Court ...................... 197
A. Interpretation of “Prison Conditions” and Applicability
to Excessive Force Claims ................................................. 197
B. “Exhausted”: What This Term Really Means .................... 201
C. Exception to Exhaustion: Unavailability ............................ 205
D. The Rules Applied .............................................................. 208
Endemic Racism in the Prison Setting: Why the Exhaustion
Requirement Should Be Amended ............................................ 210
A. A Possible Solution ............................................................ 212
Conclusion................................................................................. 214

∗
J.D. Candidate, Syracuse University College of Law 2018; B.A. English, State University
of New York at Geneseo. The author thanks her family—Elizabeth Ryan, Arnold Lefkowitz,
Madelon Finkel, and Steven Kraft—for their support and for inspiring her to always strive for more.
She also thanks her friends for being there for the late nights and long phone calls that got her
through the trials of law school. In addition, the author thanks the members of The Scholar for their
dedication and hard work in preparing this Note for publication.

189

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

1

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 20 [2018], No. 2, Art. 2

190

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 20:189

ABSTRACT
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) passed in 1996 in an effort
to curb litigation from prisoners. The exhaustion requirement of the
PLRA requires prisoners to fully exhaust any administrative remedies
available to them before filing a lawsuit concerning any aspect of prison
life. If a prisoner fails to do so, the lawsuit is subject to dismissal. The
exhaustion requirement applies to all types of prisoner lawsuits, from
claims filed for general prison conditions to excessive force and civil
rights violations. It has been consistently and aggressively applied by the
courts, blocking prisoners’ lawsuits from ever going to trial. Attempts to
exempt prisoners from its reach to allow unexhausted, yet meritorious
claims have been struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The exhaustion requirement mandates the use of an inmate grievance
procedure, most of which create time limits for the filing of a complaint.
Therefore, many of the suits dismissed for a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies cannot be subsequently exhausted. Even where
lawsuits are dismissed without prejudice for a failure to exhaust, the
expiration of an inmate’s ability to exhaust acts as a bar on his or her
lawsuit.
The PLRA also disproportionately affects black and Hispanic citizens;
these minority groups comprise the majority of incarcerated individuals.
In a society currently seeing increasing numbers of excessive force claims
brought by black citizens against police officers, the PLRA creates a
substantial obstacle for black and Hispanic inmates to bring similar
claims against corrections officers, nurses, or anyone involved in life in
the prison setting.
Due to its aggressive application and its subsequent restriction on
access to the courts, the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA should be
amended. Instead of applying a strict exhaustion requirement, the PLRA
should only require a good faith attempt at exhaustion. Additionally, the
good faith attempt at exhaustion should only be a requirement where a
prison’s grievance procedure complies with federal guidelines. This
would address the issues the PLRA intended; managing increasing
prisoner litigation, giving prisons notice of unfavorable conditions, and
preventing meritorious claims that were not exhausted from being barred
as a result of missing a deadline.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Take this, ni**er.”1 Those were the words preceding a brutal attack
and sexual assault on 30-year-old Abner Louima.2 A brawl at a club led
to a police officer being punched in the head where Louima was
mistakenly identified as the assailant.3 Louima was arrested on multiple
charges and taken to a police station in Brooklyn.4 While being
transported in a patrol car, he was beaten and had racial epithets hurled at
him.5 This was only the beginning. At the station house, Louima was
taken into the bathroom, held down, and sodomized with a plunger before
having the handle brutally forced into his mouth.6 Louima would
eventually endure emergency surgery to repair a tear in his small intestine
and an injury to his bladder before being placed on critical condition
status in the hospital.7 His attacker, officer Justin Volpe, was sentenced
to thirty years in prison, with the sentencing judge remarking “[s]hort of
intentional murder, one cannot imagine a more barbarous misuse of
power . . .”8 Louima later brought a civil suit against Volpe alleging
excessive force that settled for $7,125,000.9
No such civil suit was available for Erick Marshel, an inmate of the
New York State prison system, when he alleged two corrections officers
stripped him, beat him, and berated him with “such words as ni**er [and]
Coon []” before parading his naked, bruised body in front of other

1. Maria Hinojosa, NYC Officer Arrested in Alleged Sexual Attack on Suspect, CNN (Aug.
14, 1997, 4:29 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/US/9708/14/police.torture/ [https://perma.cc/VY9BG2HA].
2. Id.
3. See id. (charging Louima with “assault, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct and
obstructing justice”).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/14/nyregion/volpe-sentenced-to-a-30-year-term-inlouima-torture.html [https://nyti.ms/2yDZUnD] (quoting Federal Judge Eugene H. Nickerson).
9. Third Supplemental Summons in a Civil Action & Third Amended Complaint & Jury
Demand at 28, Louima v. City of N.Y., 2004 WL 2359943 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2000) (No. 98 CV
5083(SJ)), http://www.chambercoalition.org/Abner%20Louima%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma.
cc/7R6X-7GWV]; Alan Feuer & Jim Dwyer, City Settles Suit in Louima Torture, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/13/nyregion/city-settles-suit-in-louima-torture.html
[https://nyti.ms/2thuDaw].
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inmates.10 On November 3, 1998, Marshel brought legal action against
his attackers.11 He filed an amended complaint on April 19, 1999, and
on July 6, 1999, he filed a response to defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.12
Ultimately, these claims were dismissed based on a procedural
technicality: failure to exhaust, as mandated by the PLRA.13
The PLRA was enacted to curb what was seen as “an alarming
explosion in the number of lawsuits filed by state and federal
prisoners.”14 One way this was accomplished was through the creation
of an “exhaustion requirement,” which prohibited prisoners from
bringing legal action concerning prison conditions without first
exhausting all available administrative remedies.15 This exhaustion
requirement compelled prisoners to utilize inmate grievance programs,
which vary by state but typically involve filing a grievance before
proceeding through several more steps, including an appeal.16 Once a
prisoner has completed all the administrative steps outlined by their state
or federal prison facility, they have exhausted their remedies.17 If a
prisoner filed a suit in court prior to fully exhausting such remedies, the
case would be dismissed—as was the case for Marshel.18 In a country
where the majority of inmates are black and Hispanic males,19 and

10. See Marshel v. Westchester Cty., No. 98 CIV.7852(MBM), 1999 WL 1256252, at *1
n.4, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1999) (dismissing Marshel’s suit for excessive force and abuse).
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id. at *3.
14. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134 § 7, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 71–73
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)); 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
15. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (2012).
16. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (describing the grievance process
implemented by the California Department of Corrections).
17. See id. at 92–93 (contrasting administrative remedies from state habeas remedies, as the
latter is described as “having been ‘exhausted’ when they are no longer available, regardless of the
reason for their unavailability”).
18. See id. at 93 (stating that even if the prisoner procedurally defaulted in exhausting their
administrative remedies, “the prisoner is generally barred from asserting those claims in a federal
habeas proceeding.”); Marshel v. Westchester Cty., No. 98 CIV.7852(MBM), 1999 WL 1256252,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1999) (stating “ . . . it is uncontroverted that Marshel has not exhausted
his administrative remedies as he must before bringing an action in this court.”).
19. See ANN E. CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2014 at 15 (Lynne McConnell & Jill Thomas eds., 2015)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LEZ-P6QX] (showing 2.7% of
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racialized violence against prisoners is so commonplace as to warrant
investigations,20 a restraint on the filing of civil rights actions is statutory
support of institutionalized racism.
Part I of this Note will introduce the PLRA and its legislative intent,
including the flawed premise under which it was passed. Part II will look
at how the Supreme Court of the United States has strictly applied the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, further infringing on a prisoner’s
access to the court system. Part III will look at racial violence and
discrimination in the prison system, including how these issues
necessitate amending the PLRA to ensure equal access to the courts. This
proposed amendment balances a prisoner’s access to the courts with the
original goals of the PLRA.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE PLRA
On May 25, 1995, Senator Bob Dole introduced the PLRA of 1995 into
the United States Senate.21 Dole argued the legislation would curb the
number of lawsuits filed by prisoners.22 In support, Senator Dole cited
a study by Walter Berns indicating “the number of ‘due-process and cruel
and unusual punishment’ complaints filed by prisoners” as having
“grown astronomically—from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in
1994.”23 With a quick mention of the act also requiring “[s]tate prisoners
to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in [f]ederal
court,” Dole understatedly introduced the PLRA’s “Exhaustion
Requirement.”24
black males and 1.1% of Hispanic males incarcerated were serving sentences of at least 1 year
compared to 0.5% of white males).
20. E.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 2015 SPECIAL REVIEW: HIGH DESERT STATE
PRISON SUSANVILLE, CA at 11-12 (2015), http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/Reports/
Reviews/2015_Special_Review_-_High_Desert_State_Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA7B-3KQF]
[hereinafter HIGH DESERT]. During a review of officer-inmate interactions in a California prison,
researchers interviewed former inmates regarding several different factors. On the issue of race,
several minority inmates reported incidents of racially derogatory statements made by officers,
kicking of black inmates, and placing black and Hispanic inmates in longer lockdowns. Id. at 11–
12 .
21. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134 § 7, 110 Stat. 1321–66, 71–73
(1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)); 141 CONG. REC. 14570–574 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
22. 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 14571.
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In support of his assertion on the frivolity of most prisoners’ lawsuits,
Dole claimed “prisoners have filed lawsuits claiming such grievances as
insufficient storage locker space, being prohibited from attending a
wedding anniversary party, and yes, being served creamy peanut butter
instead of the chunky variety they had ordered.”25 Dole argued such
lawsuits significantly burden the court systems as they “tie up the courts,
waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of
justice enjoyed by the law-abiding population.”26
Dole cited two statistics in support of his argument that prison
litigation had substantially increased in recent years.27 He referenced a
finding by Arizona Attorney General Grant Woods stating “45 percent of
the civil cases filed in Arizona’s Federal courts last year were filed by
State prisoners.”28 Dole concluded this number meant “that 20,000
prisoners in Arizona filed almost as many cases as Arizona’s 3.5 million
law-abiding citizens.”29 This conclusion was erroneous. The Attorney
General’s statistic specifically mentioned “civil cases filed in Arizona’s
Federal courts,” and therefore what the initial number reflected was that
20,000 prisoners in Arizona filed almost as many cases in federal court
as Arizona’s 3.5 million citizens.30 This statistic makes sense when one
considers many civil lawsuits from prisoners involve civil claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and end up in federal court.31 This exercise of Article
III jurisdiction is at odds with suits filed by private citizens, which
typically include legal claims implicating state law and remain out of
federal court.
Dole’s second argument cited the increase in the gross number of
lawsuits filed by prisoners as evidence of a substantial uptick in the
amount of prisoner litigation filed.32 Dole represented this increase from

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 14570.
Id. at 14571.
Id. at 14570–571.
Id. at 14571.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added)
See U.S. DIST. COURT, DIST. OF MINN., PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS FEDERAL LITIGATION
GUIDEBOOK 3 (2015), http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/Pro-Se/PrisonerCivilRightsLitigGuide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L52S-5BJL] (providing a guide to navigate through a prisoner civil rights federal
litigation case).
32. 141 CONG. REC. 14570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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“6,600 in 1975” to “39,000 in 1994.”33 These statistics illustrate Dole’s
premise in advocating for the PLRA: to curb what was seen as a huge
problem clogging the court system.34
This premise is erroneous. First, the rate of filing should be
considered, not the number of lawsuits filed.35 Dole’s statistics fail to
take into account the sharp increase in the prison population itself
between 1975 and 1994.36 In 1975, the total prison inmate population in
the United States was 253,816.37 By 1994, the number of inmates had
risen to 1,053,738.38 This means that between 1975 and 1994, the inmate
population quadrupled.39 Accordingly, the total number of lawsuits filed
by inmates increased.
The actual rate at which inmates filed civil rights complaints in federal
court reached an all-time high in 1981 with 29.3 complaints filed per
1,000 inmates.40 By the time the PLRA was introduced in 1994, the rate
had dropped to 23.2 complaints per 1,000 inmates.41 The enactment of
the PLRA was a reaction to increased incarceration in the United States,
not increased rates at which prisoners filed lawsuits.42
33. Id.
34. See id. at 14571 (suggesting lawsuits filed by prisoners were an encumbrance on judicial
resources, stating “time and money spent defending most of these cases are clearly time and money
that could be better spent prosecuting criminals, fighting illegal drugs, or cracking down on
consumer fraud”).
35. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1578-87 (2003).
36. See id. at 1578–87 (“[A]fter 1981, annual increases in inmate federal civil rights filings
were primarily associated, in nearly every state, with the growing incarcerated population[.]”); see
also WILFRED J. DIXON & FRANK J. MASSEY, JR., INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 3
(1st ed. 1951) (providing examples of common issues in statistical analysis including variability
and correlation).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 1925–81, at 3
(1982),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3922-QJKB]
[hereinafter JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981].
38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 1
(1995), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94F-DPT5] [hereinafter
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994].
39. Compare JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981, supra note 37, at 3 (evidencing the total U.S.
prisoner population as 253,816 in 1975), with JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994, supra note 38, at 1 (1995),
(evidencing the total U.S. prison population as 1,053,738 in 1994).
40. See Schlanger, supra note 35, at 1578–87 (“[A]bsolute filing numbers alone are helpful
only if the issue is litigation processing, not litigation rates.”).
41. Id. at 1583.
42. See David Fathi, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United
States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 16, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/16/no-equal-
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This sharp increase in United States incarcerations was a result of
President Reagan’s massive expansion of the War on Drugs.43 This new
aggressiveness in drug enforcement resulted in over 400,000 nonviolent
drug offenders being imprisoned by 1997.44 The War on Drugs not only
contributed to overall high incarceration rates, but also to the increasing
disparity between the racial make-up of the United States prison
population.45 During the 1980s, federal penalties for crack cocaine were
exorbitantly harsher than those for powder cocaine, an inconsistency that
disproportionately sentenced black offenders to much lengthier prison
sentences than white offenders.46 As Michelle Alexander noted in her
book The New Jim Crow, “[n]othing has contributed more to the
systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States than
the War on Drugs.”47
By instituting racially charged and draconian drug laws, federal
sentencing schemes incarcerated African-Americans at a higher rate and
for longer durations.48 Additionally, the War on Drugs contributed to
over-population and over-crowding in prisons across the United States.49
Yet instead of addressing these issues and the subsequent increase in
litigation they caused, the PLRA was passed to simply cut off the filing

justice/prison-litigation-reform-act-united-states [https://perma.cc/9D82-GA7L] (stating that
between 1995 and 1997, federal civil rights filings fell by 33% despite the 10% increase of
incarcerated persons).
43. A Brief History of the Drug War, DRUG POLICY, http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/newsolutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0 [https://perma.cc/PAZ3-CR9H] [hereinafter A
Brief History] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). See also Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives
Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1313–17 (Oct. 14, 1982).
44. A Brief History, supra note 43.
45. Race and the Drug War, DRUG POLICY, http://www.drugpolicy.org/race-and-drug-war
[https://perma.cc/9KFW-AN37] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
46. Id.
47. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 60 (2012).
48. See Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical Distinction
Between Stock and Flow BROOKINGS (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/socialmobility-memos/2015/11/25/drug-offenders-in-american-prisons-the-critical-distinction-betweenstock-and-flow [https://perma.cc/VG7Y-ADVN] (reporting African-Americans are 3 to 4 times
more likely to be incarcerated for drug crimes even though they are no more likely to use or sell
drugs than whites).
49. Pamela Engel, Watch How Quickly The War on Drugs Changed America’s Prison
Population, BUSINESS INSIDER (April 23. 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/howthe-war-on-drugs-changed-americas-prison-population-2014-4 [https://perma.cc/7RUK-HJLJ].
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of lawsuits.50 In other words, it addressed a symptom of a systemic
problem, not the source.51
III. THE PLRA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SUPREME COURT
When the PLRA was enacted in 1996, the language of its exhaustion
requirement was fairly innocuous on its face.52 It read that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”53 Facially, it read like any other exhaustion requirement
common to administrative law prohibiting judicial review prior to
Almost
appealing a decision from an administrative body.54
immediately, courts began questioning the applicability of the exhaustion
requirement,55 and the Supreme Court’s interpretations turned a statute
already restricting access to the courts into a greater obstacle for prisoners
to overcome.56
A. Interpretation of “Prison Conditions” and Applicability to
Excessive Force Claims
Confusion emerged over what constituted “prison conditions” and
whether the term included excessive use of physical force claims brought
50. Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re out of
Court – It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 497 (1997).
51. Schlanger, supra note 35, at 1694 (highlighting PLRA reduced overall litigation by
making it uneconomical for inmates to pursue low-stake cases even when such cases are high in
merit).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
53. Id.
54. Clive Lewis, The Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies in Administrative Law, 51
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 138, 139 (1992).
55. Compare Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding the term
“prison conditions” as used in the statute included excessive force claims), with Lawrence v. Goord,
238 F.3d 182, 185 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that particularized instances of retaliatory conduct, like
particularized instances of force, are not subject to the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion
requirements).
56. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that even though the prison
grievance procedure did not provide for requested monetary relief, an inmate was nonetheless
required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit with respect to prison conditions);
see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 519 (2002) (holding that the exhaustion requirement
applied to all prisoners seeking redress for prison conditions or occurrences, regardless of whether
the claim involved general circumstances or a particular episode).
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under the Eighth Amendment.57 If such claims were not included by the
broad phrasing of “prison conditions,” then exhaustion of administrative
remedies would not be required prior to filing.58 The Second Circuit
addressed this issue in Nussle v. Willette.59 Appellant Ronald Nussle
claimed a corrections officer assaulted him while he was in the custody
of the Connecticut Department of Corrections.60 Nussle alleged he was
the victim of a continued pattern of “harassment and intimidation,”
including an incident where two corrections officers “entered his cell,
instructed him to leave the cell, and proceeded to beat him without
apparent provocation or justification of any sort.”61 They continued to
attack him, beating him so badly “he lost control of his bowels.”62
Nussle alleged “the officers threatened to kill him if he reported the
beating.”63 Nussle filed suit in district court without first filing a
grievance with the prison or utilizing any administrative remedies.64 He
brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officers violated
“his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.”65 The suit was dismissed due to his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.66
Nussle appealed to the Second Circuit, which addressed the issue of
“whether the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), encompasses claims for excessive use of physical
force under the Eighth Amendment.”67 The Second Circuit began their
analysis by noting that as a general matter, exhaustion is not required for
§ 1983 claims and that the legislative intent of § 1983 supports “this
presumptive rule of non-exhaustion.”68
The “very purpose” of § 1983 claims was “to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 99–100 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
Id. at 100; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013).
224 F.3d 95, 96–97 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
Id. at 97.
Id.
See id. (describing the injuries that resulted from the attack).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97–98.
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federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under
color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.’”69 However, the court noted the PLRA created a specific
exhaustion requirement in this case, and therefore, “if claims for
particular instances of assault or excessive force are properly considered
claims ‘brought with respect to prison conditions,’ then Nussle
must . . . exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before
taking his federal claims to court.”70
The Second Circuit recognized other circuits had previously found the
exhaustion requirement to apply in such circumstances.71 The court
turned to an analysis of the language of the PLRA and concluded “the use
of the term ‘prison conditions’ in § 1997e(a) would appear to refer to
‘circumstances affecting everyone in the area affected by them,’ rather
than ‘single or momentary matter[s],’ such as beatings or assaults, that
are directed at particular individuals.”72 Additionally, the court looked
to the Supreme Court’s own handling of prisoner suits and found that the
“[p]re-PLRA Supreme Court decisions disaggregate the broad category
of Eighth Amendment claims so as to distinguish between ‘excessive
force’ claims, on the one hand, and ‘conditions of confinement’ claims,
on the other.”73 Therefore, the Second Circuit held there was a distinct
difference “between ‘excessive force’ and ‘prison conditions’ claims for
purposes of exhaustion under § 1997e(a) and conclude[d] that exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not required for claims of assault or
excessive force brought under § 1983.”74
Nussle’s victory was short lived.75 The Second Circuit’s decision was
appealed, and in an effort to resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.76 They reversed the Second Circuit’s holding and

69. See id. (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)); see also Patsy v. Bd. of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (noting the precursor to §1983 was first enacted during
Reconstruction when the Federal Government established itself as a guarantor of basic federal
rights against intrusions of state power).
70. Nussle, 224 F.3d at 100.
71. Id.; see also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293–98 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding excessive
force claims are actions “brought with respect to prison conditions” under § 1997e(a)).
72. Nussle, 224 F.3d at 101.
73. Id. at 106.
74. Id.
75. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
76. Id.
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found “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong.”77 The Court elaborated they had previously separated
suits about incarceration into two categories: “those challenging the fact
or duration of confinement itself” and “those challenging the conditions
of confinement.”78 The Court noted “the latter category unambiguously
embraced the kind of single episode cases that petitioner’s construction
would exclude.”79 Contrary to the Second Circuit’s argument, it further
found the use of the phrase “prison conditions” could be intended to make
clear pre-incarceration claims fell outside of § 1997e(a), and not to
separate out single incidents that occur while incarcerated.80 Otherwise,
a prisoner who had been assaulted would not have to exhaust, whereas a
prisoner who was systematically beaten and abused would have to.81
Porter v. Nussle established that brutality and violence against
prisoners by corrections officers is, legally, a “prison condition.”82 It
allowed no exception from the exhaustion requirement for instances of
excessive force stemming from corrections officers or prison
employees.83 This burden firmly restricted a prisoner’s access to civil
remedies in cases of excessive force.84 It seems the way to avoid these
issues would be for inmates to fully exhaust before filing lawsuits, yet

77. Id.
78. Id. at 527 (citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 (1991)); see also, Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 505 (1973) (“[A] prisoner may challenge the conditions of his
confinement by petition for writ of habeas corpus, . . . provided he attacks only the conditions of
his confinement and not its fact or duration.”).
79. Porter, 534 U.S. at 527 (citing McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 (1991)).
80. Id. at 529.
81. See id. at 531 (discussing the “circumstance dichotomy” that exists within the Second
Circuit’s belief).
82. See id. at 528 (citing to the decisions of McCarthy and Preiser that “tug strongly away
from classifying suits about prison guards’ use of excessive force, one or many times, as anything
other than actions ‘with respect to prison conditions’”).
83. See id. at 524 (explaining “exhaustion is now required for all ‘actions … brought with
respect to prison conditions,’ whether under §1983 or ‘any other Federal law’”).
84. See id. (quoting a provision of §1983 that mandates “all available ‘remedies’ must . . . be
exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and
effective’”).
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Supreme Court precedent set a high bar in determining what constituted
“exhaust[ion].”85
B. “Exhausted”: What This Term Really Means
Omitted from the plain language of the PLRA was a definition for
“exhausted.”86 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Woodford v.
Ngo, there was a circuit split concerning “whether a prisoner can satisfy
the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement . . . by filing
an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance
or appeal.”87 The Sixth Circuit previously found untimely grievances
counted as exhaustion of remedies as they still served both “Congress’s
purpose in passing the PLRA and Supreme Court precedent regarding the
exhaustion doctrine’s oft-stated purpose: to give prison officials the first
opportunity to address inmate complaints.”88 Other courts, such as the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, were more strict and “interpreted the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement as requiring a timely grievance by a prisoner at
the administrative level before the prisoner initiates a federal cause of
action.”89
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Woodford v. Ngo.90
Ngo filed a grievance concerning restricted access to religious activities
against the California prison system.91 Ngo’s grievance, however, was
time-barred because it was filed six months after the restriction
commenced, rather than within fifteen days of the alleged occurrence in
accordance with prison policy.92 Ngo appealed that decision, but was
unsuccessful; he ultimately resorted to filing a lawsuit in federal district
85. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (discussing the specifics of mandatory
exhaustion for administrative remedies, including utilizing procedures the agency “holds out, and
doing so properly” such that the merits are addressed).
86. See id. at 93 (inferring “exhausted” has the same meaning as it does in administrative
law, given the PLRA’s reference to “such administrative remedies as are available”).
87. Id. at 83–84.
88. Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that “so long as an
inmate presents his or her grievance to prison officials and appeals through the available
procedures, the inmate has exhausted his or her administrative remedies, and a prison’s decision
not to address the grievance because it was untimely under prison rules shall not bar the federal
suit.”).
89. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 626–27 (9th Cir. 2005).
90. 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
91. Id. at 86–87.
92. Id. at 87.
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court.93 The district court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to
exhaust based on the initial untimely grievance.94 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding “Ngo exhausted all administrative remedies available
to him as required by the PLRA when he completed all avenues of
administrative review available to him: [h]is administrative appeal was
deemed time-barred and no further level of appeal remained in the state
prison’s internal appeals process.”95
The Supreme Court analyzed the theory of exhaustion and found that
“[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can
function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the
course of its proceedings.”96 The question then became whether the
totality of “proper exhaustion” was required.97 In looking to the statute,
the Court found that “requiring proper exhaustion serves the purposes of
the PLRA.”98 To construe otherwise would render the PLRA “a
toothless scheme[,]” as prisoners could simply wait until their grievances
were time-barred, and then proceed directly to federal court if it was
rejected as untimely.99 For these reasons, the Court held total exhaustion
and compliance with internal procedures and deadlines was required prior
to bringing prisoners’ lawsuits.100
The Woodford decision was not unanimous. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, dissented.101 The dissent noted
“[t]he citizen’s right to access an impartial tribunal to seek redress for
official grievances is so fundamental and so well established that it is
sometimes taken for granted.”102 The dissent challenged the factual
allegations of the case on two grounds. First, the dissent contested the

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
96. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006).
97. Id. at 95.
98. Id. at 93–95.
99. Id. at 95.
100. See id. at 93 (alteration in original) (“The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] attempts to
eliminate unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seeks
to ‘affor[d] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal case.’”).
101. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
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very idea that Ngo’s grievance was untimely.103 Stevens’s dissent
emphasized Ngo “filed a second grievance after his first grievance was
rejected, arguing that his first grievance was in fact timely because he
was challenging petitioners’ continuing prohibition on his capacity to
participate in Catholic observances, such as Confession, Holy Week
services, and Bible study.”104
Second, the dissent pointed out that a statute limiting a private citizen
to a fifteen day window to file a lawsuit in federal court would certainly
be unenforceable.105 Justice Stevens summarized the issue as whether
“Congress intended to authorize state correction officials to impose a
comparable limitation on prisoners’ constitutionally protected right of
access to the federal courts.”106 To this question, the dissent resolutely
felt “the correct interpretation of the statute would recognize that, in
enacting the PLRA, [m]embers of Congress created a rational regime
designed to reduce the quantity of frivolous prison litigation while
adhering to their constitutional duty ‘to respect the dignity of all persons,’
even ‘those convicted of heinous crimes.’”107 The dissent further asked
whether “a 48-hour limitations period [would] furnish a meaningful
opportunity for a prisoner to raise meritorious grievances in the context
of a juvenile who has been raped and repeatedly assaulted, with the
knowledge and assistance of guards, while in detention?”108 Scenarios
such as this could raise very real constitutional challenges to the
exhaustion requirement itself due to the majority’s adoption of a total
And yet, complying with such
exhaustion requirement.109
constitutionally questionable procedures mired by internal time-sensitive
constraints is precisely what “proper exhaustion” requires.

103. Id. at 120–21 (asserting the prison’s denial of an opportunity to engage in religious
activity was ongoing, and therefore, the grievance was timely within prison’s 15-day statute of
limitations).
104. Id. at 121.
105. Id. at 104.
106. Id.
107. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 121.
109. See id. at 122 (suggesting such strict enforcement of exhaustion conflicts with the
notion that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition
the Government for redress of grievances.” (quoting Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 741 (1983))).
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The majority’s fear that allowing untimely grievances to count as
exhaustion would enable prisoners to circumvent the grievance process
fails to account for the difficulty of navigating a prison grievance system.
Each prison can set its own internal procedures and deadlines, including
what steps are required to fully exhaust administrative remedies.
For example, in New York, there are three levels of review an inmate
must go through before fully exhausting all remedies.110 First, an inmate
must file a grievance within twenty-one days of the alleged incident.111
Once an inmate receives a written response from the Inmate Grievance
Resolution Committee (IGRC), the inmate has seven days to file an
appeal to the superintendent.112 After the inmate receives a decision
from the superintendent, he or she must then file an appeal to the Central
Office Review Committee (CORC)113 within seven days. The inmate
must receive a final decision from CORC before he or she is able to file
suit in court without fear of dismissal for failure to exhaust.114 If a
prisoner files while waiting on a final decision, the suit will be subject to
dismissal.115
New York is only one of several state inmate grievance systems. In
light of Ngo, a prisoner who accidentally files a grievance or appeal, even
one day late, during any step in any of the state grievance systems might
be permanently barred from bringing a lawsuit.116 Roughly six months
after deciding Ngo, the Supreme Court considered whether a lawsuit
containing a mix of exhausted and unexhausted claims could proceed. In
Jones v. Bock, the Court rejected a rule that would require judges “to
dismiss the entire action if the prisoner fails to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement as to any single claim in his complaint.”117 On its face, such
a holding seemed to protect prisoners from having the entirety of their
suit thrown out if they failed to exhaust some claims, but fully exhausted

110. N. Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 701.5 (2017).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See generally Woodford, 548 U.S. at 81 (holding “proper exhaustion” is required in
that prisoners must fully exhaust all available administrative remedies under the PLRA).
116. Id.
117. 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).
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others.118 However, the holding should have been extended to allow all
claims to proceed as long as some in the suit were exhausted. Instead,
application of the Jones decision potentially dismisses a prisoner’s
lawsuit if such lawsuit is broader in scope than the original grievance.119
Omitting even part of an incident when filling out a grievance could lead
to dismissal for that part of a prisoner’s lawsuit. Again, the rationale
behind this rule was based on the idea that prisoners would deliberately
avoid exhaustion and gave little thought to the number of claims that may
be barred simply because a prisoner failed to mention part of an
altercation in their original grievance.
For a statute created to ease judicial burdens, and that has been so
aggressively applied by the Supreme Court, circuit courts instead have
strained to aid prisoners by carving out exceptions to the PLRA where
they can.120 A mandatory requirement of total exhaustion eliminates any
space for the judiciary to exercise discretion and review meritorious
claims which may not be completely exhausted. The PLRA should be
amended to require only a good faith attempt at exhaustion, not the
“proper exhaustion” standard held by the Supreme Court. Despite the
need, attempts by the circuits to carve out exemptions allowing such
claims through have been struck down by the Supreme Court.
C. Exception to Exhaustion: Unavailability
Amending the PLRA statute to require only a good faith attempt at
exhausting administrative remedies would allow courts to exercise more
discretion without forcing judicially created exceptions to the PLRA.
One existing statutory exception to the exhaustion requirement is in the
text itself: part (a) of Section 1997e requires exhaustion of
“administrative remedies as are available.”121 This language left the

118. See Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker,486 F.3d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing a
previous decision dismissing an inmate’s entire grievance claim for failure to exhaust all available
remedies for each discrete claim following the Supreme Court’s Jones decision). The remand order
in Abdul-Muhammad instructed the District court to determine which of the prisoner’s claims had
been properly exhausted. Id.
119. Jones, 549 U.S. at 203.
120. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 273 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that “if the judge
determines that the plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies or that his or her failure to
exhaust should be excused, the case may proceed to the merits.”).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
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determination of what constitutes an available remedy to the courts.122
The Second Circuit interpreted “available” narrowly, and carved out
“special circumstances” under which failing to comply with
administrative procedures for various reasons was excusable.123 Such
special circumstances might include lack of clarity in a grievance
procedure124 or a fear of retaliation.125
This approach was later adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Blake v. Ross,
which noted “the exhaustion requirement is not absolute.” 126 The
Fourth Circuit further concluded “[t]here are certain ‘special
circumstances’ in which, though administrative remedies may have been
available . . . the prisoner’s failure to comply with administrative
procedural requirements may nevertheless have been justified.”127
Shaidon Blake was an inmate who failed to file a grievance after being
assaulted.128 Due to the ambiguous wording of the inmate grievance
procedure, Blake believed an investigation into his assault, which found
the corrections officers in fact used excessive force, meant he was not
required to file a grievance.129 He proceeded to file a § 1983 claim in
court.130 The district court dismissed the claim, and the Fourth Circuit—
122. See generally Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the
meaning of “available” remedies in relation to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement).
123. Id. at 686; see also Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d. Cir. 2004) (citing Berry v.
Kerik, 366 F. 3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2003))
If the court finds that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants
are not estopped and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the plaintiff
nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, the court should consider whether ‘special
circumstances’ have been plausibly alleged that justify ‘the prisoner’s failure to comply with
administrative procedural requirements.’

124. Giano, 380 F.3d at 675.
125. Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 691.
126. 787 F.3d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 2015).
127. See id. (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 2004)).
128. Id. at 695. Shaidon Blake was assaulted by two guards in a Baltimore prison. The
guards punched Blake multiple times in the face while Blake was handcuffed. Rachel Poser, Why
It’s Nearly Impossible for Prisoners to Sue Prisons, THE NEW YORKER (May 30, 2016)
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible-for-prisoners-to-sueprisons [https://perma.cc/5S6M-7NFJ].
129. Blake, 787 F.3d at 698.
130. Id. Blake’s complaint fell into two agency review procedures; the Internal
Investigative Unit (IIU) which investigated prison employee misconduct, and the Administrative
Remedy Procedure (ARP) which prescribes procedures an inmate must follow to obtain an
administrative remedy. Id. at 698–701. Blake originally thought the IIU investigation fulfilled his
administrative remedy obligation which conflicted with the prescribed procedures under ARP. Id.
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using its newly adopted “special circumstances” exception—
reversed.131
The Fourth Circuit applied the Second Circuit’s two-part test in
determining whether to excuse total exhaustion on the grounds of faulty
or unclear grievance procedures.132 First, the court considered “whether
‘the prisoner was justified in believing that his complaints in the
disciplinary appeal procedurally exhausted his administrative remedies
because the prison’s remedial system was confusing,’ and second,
‘whether the prisoner’s submissions in the disciplinary appeals process
exhausted his remedies in a substantive sense by affording corrections
officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally.’”133 The
Fourth Circuit determined this inquiry struck the appropriate balance
between equity to inmates confronted with confusing internal procedures
who still attempt to exhaust, while simultaneously upholding the goals of
the exhaustion requirement by preventing “unnecessary and unexpected
litigation.”134
The Supreme Court disagreed. In the Court’s subsequent review, it
termed such an approach “freewheeling” and “inconsistent with the
PLRA.”135 Yet the Court did not hold that rejecting a “special
circumstances” exception necessarily precluded Blake’s suit, “because
the PLRA contains its own textual exception to mandatory
exhaustion.”136 Instead, the Court ruled “a prisoner need exhaust only
‘available’ administrative remedies” and reframed Blake’s argument as a
“contention that the prison’s grievance process was not in fact available
to him.”137 The Court further defined availability, reasoning that “an
inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures
that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained
of.’”138 Three situations were immediately identified as fitting into that
scenario: (1) where an administrative procedure is unavailable because
131. Id. at 698.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2007)).
134. Id.
135. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1855 (2016).
136. Id. at 1856.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737–38 (2001) (considering
multiple conflicting definitions for “remedies” and “available” following an inmate’s allegations
of cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of corrections officers)).
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there is a dead end; (2) where an administrative scheme is “so opaque that
it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” or “no ordinary
prisoner can discern or navigate” it; (3) and finally, where “prison
administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance
process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”139
Due to numerous inconsistencies and confusion in Maryland’s
grievance procedures, the Supreme Court found it plausible that Blake
may not have had “available” remedies, and therefore, his claim may very
well have been exhausted.140 However, the Fourth Circuit’s finding that
Blake fit a “special circumstance” exception was reversed.141 Instead,
the case was remanded for further analysis to determine whether
Maryland’s unclear grievance procedures rendered administrative
remedies practically unavailable.142 These cases deciding the meaning
of the exhaustion requirement work together to form an intricate network
of judicial rules that prisoners must traverse in order to have a chance at
their day in court.
D. The Rules Applied
Court rulings interpreting the exhaustion requirement work in
conjunction to make any prison grievance system difficult to navigate,
and amending the PLRA to require only a good faith initial attempt at
exhaustion would prevent outcomes like that of Bryant v. Rich.143
Although Bryant was decided before Ross v. Blake, the Eleventh Circuit
had not yet adopted a Hemphill analysis and was therefore unaffected by
the Ross decision.144
In Bryant, the Court addressed whether the claims of two prisoners,
Andrew Priester and Gregory Bryant, had been exhausted.145 The court
held neither had exhausted their administrative remedies.146 The
analysis of Bryant’s failure to exhaust is particularly enlightening as to

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 1860–61.
Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1854.
Id.
530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
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the contortions courts have had to go through in an attempt to uniformly
apply the PLRA.
Bryant was subjected to excessive force by corrections officers,
including being kicked and beaten.147 His filed grievance detailing the
account was denied.148 Bryant then filed an appeal within five days,
instead of the mandated four, because he was misinformed as to the time
frame for filing such grievances, and did not receive an appeal form until
the fourth day.149 The Court determined this did not count as exhaustion
because Bryant still could have petitioned for the time limit to be waived
after his appeal was dismissed as untimely.150
Bryant was again subjected to excessive force, this time in retaliation
for filing the initial grievance.151 Out of fear of what would happen if
he reported the incident, he did not file another grievance before being
transferred to a separate prison.152 While the court did not fault him for
not filing a grievance due to his fear of reprisal, it still did not consider
him to be excused from exhaustion.153 The court noted that he failed to
file a grievance once transferred, despite the fact that such a grievance
would be considered untimely.154 In order to have completely
exhausted, he needed to have “filed an out-of-time grievance and then
shown good cause for its untimeliness.”155 As he did not do so, “Bryant
failed to exhaust an administrative remedy that was available to him.”156
The mental hoops the court jumped through in order to find the claims
had not been exhausted are, themselves, exhausting to follow. Up front,
the court found Bryant had not exhausted his initial claim because his
appeal was untimely. It then mandated an untimely grievance in order to
complete the exhaustion process. The court seemed to rely on the off
chance that Bryant could have met a “good cause standard” and found his
147. Id. at 1372.
148. Id. at 1378.
149. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378.
150. Id. at 1379 (associating prison administration procedure allowing time limit
requirements to be waived following a good cause showing with full exhaustion of remedies
required by the PLRA).
151. Id. at 1372.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1379.
154. Id.
155. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1379.
156. Id.
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failure to petition for an extension to the very deadlines outlined in the
inmate grievance procedures precluded him from being heard in court.157
But when circuit courts cannot agree on when an inmate has exhausted
his or her administrative remedies under the PLRA’s requirement,158
how is an inmate supposed to know? Literature on this topic has sprouted
in an attempt to help inmates decipher this critical inquiry, but it can only
do so much.159
IV. ENDEMIC RACISM IN THE PRISON SETTING:
WHY THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE AMENDED
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the complicated rules
promulgated both by the courts and prison systems do not exist in a
vacuum. Instead, they exist in a country where prisons host endemic
racism and the majority of inmates are black and Hispanic. In 2010, the
Southern Poverty Law Center found that “[i]n at least six states, guards
have appeared in mock Klan attire in recent years, and guards have been
accused of race-based threats, beatings and even shootings in 10
states.”160 In 2015, state officials in Northern California found an
“entrenched culture” of racism after conducting an investigation of High
Desert State Prison.161 In interviews with inmates, officials reported that
157. Id.
158. See e.g., Dillon v. Rogers 596 F.3d 260, 267–68 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding the full
exhaustion requirement is not excused when an inmate fails to follow grievance procedures at their
current detention facility for a beating by corrections officers when inmate was being held at a
previous, temporary facility no longer in existence). Spada v. Martinez, 579 Fed. App’x. 82, 86 (3d
Cir. 2014) (excusing exhaustion after an administrative remedy was deemed not available as a result
of prison staff withholding grievance forms from an inmate). At the time of Spada’s grievance
request, Pennsylvania did not have a provision permitting time limits to be waived following a
showing of good cause and subsequently did not require Spada to file an untimely grievance in
order to comply with the full exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Id. at 86, n.3. The contrast in
these decisions also points out the lack of consistencies in prisoner grievance procedures which
also create confusing and differing applications of the PLRA by the circuit courts.
159. Terri LeClercq, Prison Grievances: When to Write, How to Write (2013).
160. Allegations of Racist Guards Are Plaguing the Corrections Industry, INTELLIGENCE
REP.,
SPLC,
Dec.
2000,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligencereport/2000/allegations-racist-guards-are-plaguing-corrections-industry [https://perma.cc/UQ9K9W4J] (last visited December 30, 2017).
161. See Paige St. John, State investigators cite culture of abuse, racism by High Desert
State Prison guards, LA TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-pol-abuse-californiaprison-20151216-story.html [https://perma.cc/6XBD-XG96] (last visited December 30, 2017)
(asserting officers have essentially setup inmates for attack); HIGH DESERT, supra note 20, at 11–
13.
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“[b]lack inmates wouldn’t get enough time to eat; the officers would
‘kick’ the blacks out of the chow hall first and then the Hispanics.”162
Ultimately, the investigation concluded that “[f]rom the casual use of
derogatory racial terms to de facto discrimination, it became apparent to
the [Office of the Inspector General] there is a serious issue at [High
Desert State Prison,] and that the institution’s leadership appears
oblivious to these problems.”163
A New York Times article recently uncovered some equally troubling
statistics.164 It found black and Hispanic inmates were disciplined at
much higher rates than white inmates.165 Black and Hispanic inmates
were also kept in solitary confinement more frequently and for longer
durations.166 This discrepancy was most apparent in prisons with a low
correlation between the racial composition of the inmate population and
the racial composition of the custody staff.167 In fact, the article found
that “[a]t Clinton, a prison near the Canadian border where only one of
the 998 guards is African American, black inmates were nearly four times
as likely to be sent to isolation as whites, and they were held there for an
average of 125 days, compared with 90 days for whites.”168
The racial disparity in punishments seems to disappear when the racial
composition of inmates is reflected in the racial composition of the
guards.169 At Sing Sing Correctional Facility in Ossining, “[b]lack
officers make up the majority of the uniformed staff . . . ” and according
to the New York Times “[t]here were no disciplinary disparities between
whites and blacks at Sing Sing.”170
After an investigation into the brutal attack of Kevin Moore, an inmate
at Downstate Correctional Facility who was savagely beaten before

162. HIGH DESERT, supra note 20, at 11. At High Desert, 76% of custody staff is white,
contrasting with 79% of inmates who are black or Hispanic. Id. at 12.
163. Id.
164. Michael Schwirtz, The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York State’s Prisons, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-state-prisons-inmates-racialbias.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1 [https://nyti.ms/2jDMoMz] (last visited December
30, 2017).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (following review of 1,286 prison rule violations inmates received)
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corrections officers ripped dreadlocks out of his head as keepsakes, the
United States Attorney prosecuting the case announced “[e]xcessive use
of force in prisons, we believe, has reached crisis proportions in New
York State.”171 Investigations and studies clearly show black and
Hispanic inmates are far more likely to suffer serious violations of their
constitutional rights in prison,172 and are therefore more seriously
impacted by the strict exhaustion requirements.
A.

A Possible Solution

If excessive force in prisons has reached crisis proportion, how can a
statute that strictly limits remedies for excessive force in prisons possibly
be justified? How many lawsuits from inmates victimized by institutional
racism in High Desert State Prison, or Clinton, or Downstate Correctional
were barred from ever being heard on the merits simply because they filed
a grievance a day late? How many prisoners, like Erick Marshel, could
have emerged victorious on his or her claims if not for a procedural
technicality?
In light of the issues surrounding the correctional system today, the
stringent exhaustion requirement of the PLRA should be amended to
require only an initial good faith attempt at exhaustion, and only if a
prison’s administrative remedies comply with federal regulations. This
solution would allow
[C]ourts to punish prisoners who seek to deliberately bypass state
administrative remedies, but [ . . . ] would not impose the draconian
punishment of procedural default on prisoners who make reasonable,
good-faith efforts to comply with relevant administrative rules but[,] out
of fear of retaliation, a reasonable mistake of law, or simple inadvertence,
make some procedural misstep along the way.173

171. Michael Winerip, Five New York Prison Guards Charged in ‘13 Beating of Inmate,
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/nyregion/new-york-officers-downstateN.Y.
correctional-facility-inmate-beating.html [https://nyti.ms/2lDpSCj] (last visited December 30,
2017).
172. Schwirtz, supra note 164; see generally HIGH DESERT, supra note 20 (citing a 2015
special review of High Desert State Prison in California and finding that several inmates reported
experiencing overt racism).
173. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 119 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens posited his own solution in his Woodford dissent.174 He
suggested “[f]ederal courts simply exercise their discretion to dismiss
suits brought by the former group of litigants (those seeking to bypass
administrative remedies) but not those brought by the latter (those
inmates who have made good faith efforts, but failed to comply with
administrative procedures).”175 This was the very approach the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement sought to remedy. The precursor to the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement was the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
(CRIPA) “exhaustion of remedies” requirement.176 It allowed the court
to exercise discretion in requiring exhaustion if it felt “plain, speedy, and
effective administrative remedies [were] available.”177 This approach
would cause inequity amongst the districts: areas with substantially more
prison litigation would be more inclined to dismiss than those less
burdened by such a problem.
To prevent inequity, exhaustion should be required uniformly, but only
where exhaustion remedies are available. Courts should not require the
“total exhaustion” or “proper exhaustion” delineated in Woodford.
Instead, good faith attempts to comply with a grievance procedure should
be enough, regardless of whether an initial grievance was timely or
whether deadlines were missed during subsequent appeals. This would
encourage prisoners to utilize grievance systems where available and
simultaneously give prisons notice of deficits in facility conditions.
CRIPA also did not allow exhaustion to be required unless the
“Attorney General has certified[,] or the court has determined[,] that such
administrative remedies are in substantial compliance” with minimum
standards outlined in subsequent sections of the statute.178 This ensured
prisoners were not being routed to faulty grievance systems in an effort
to bypass litigation. CRIPA’s minimum standard should be adopted as
part of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. As it stands now, the only
recourse available to a prisoner arguing to be excused from the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA on grounds of a faulty grievance

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1980) (modified by enforcement of PLRA exhaustion requirement
under current 42 U.S.C. § 1997e).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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system is to claim that very grievance system was “unavailable” under
Ross precedent.179
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement should be amended to require
only initial, good faith attempts at exhaustion, and only where a prison’s
administrative procedures meet minimum federal standards. This middle
ground provides inmates with access to the court systems as long as they
attempt to follow inmate grievance procedures. However, it does not bar
their claims based on procedural technicalities. This approach achieves
the goal of managing inmate complaints without flooding the court
system with frivolous litigation. It continues to allow prisons
opportunities to receive first notice of their deficiencies and to correct
problems within their institution before proceeding to court. When
balancing the burden placed on prisons and courts with a citizen’s ability
to seek redress, a citizen’s basic human rights and access to the courts
must be given considerable weight.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the issues currently facing the prison system, including
endemic racism and excessive force from corrections officers, the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, as it is currently enforced, is too strict.
Current Supreme Court precedent mandates “proper exhaustion,” which
is too high a bar for prisoners to meet. Proper exhaustion requires a
prisoner to fully comply with a prison’s grievance system—a system
which varies from state to state and currently has no federal oversight—
before the prisoner files suit in court.180 Failure to do so can cause the
prisoner’s lawsuit to be dismissed.181 This grueling standard does
nothing to account for the complexity of a state’s particular grievance
system or an inmate’s misunderstanding of grievance procedures. It is a
unilateral bar that does not give judges the discretion to excuse a failure
to exhaust, or to allow meritorious claims to proceed through the judicial
process.
The PLRA should be amended to ease the burden on prisoners by
requiring only a good faith initial attempt at exhaustion, and only where
a prison’s grievance procedures meet minimum federal standards. This

179. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1860–61 (2016).
180. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 97 (2d. Cir. 2000) rev’d, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
181. Id.
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solution places more discretion in the hands of the judiciary and achieves
the PLRA’s goals without denying prisoners access to courts for merely
missing a deadline. With such an amendment, prisoners would be
required to at least attempt to put prisons on notice as to detrimental
conditions, but they would not be barred from pursuing claims for failing
to do so in light of faulty or confusing grievance procedures. By
including this good faith amendment, the PLRA can work towards
improving both prisons and the lives of the prisoners within them.
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